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A. Introduction 
The provision for energy1 in the Scotland Act 2016 is piecemeal and lacking substance. Perhaps, 
given the contested political context from which the Act emerged, it would be surprising if it were 
otherwise.  
Scotland’s energy resources, in particular North Sea oil and its renewable energy potential, 
were significant elements in the case for Scottish independence during the 2014 independence 
referendum.2 In the post-devolution period, and particularly since the election of the first Scottish 
National Party Scottish Government in 2007, there has been an uneasy relationship between 
Holyrood and Westminster over energy. It is reserved (with limited exceptions for the promotion of 
renewable energy and energy efficiency) to the UK Parliament under the Scotland Act 19983, but the 
UK Government is reliant on the exercise by Scottish Ministers of devolved powers in planning and 
environmental protection to implement onshore energy infrastructure development north of the 
border, and specific competence over the Renewables Obligation – until recently the main revenue 
support mechanism for renewable electricity – was executively devolved ten years ago.4 Scottish 
Ministers have therefore blocked new nuclear power stations in Scotland5 and forged ahead with an 
ambitious renewable energy programme. Since the referendum, there has been a spate of UK 
government decisions on energy, such as the withdrawal of funding for carbon capture and storage 
development, the closure of the Longannet coal-fired power station and the withdrawal of subsidies 
for renewable energy. All of them have, whether by accident or design, undermined Scotland’s 
“energy independence” in advance of any second independence referendum. The 2016 Act reflects 
the ebb and flow of this cross-border constitutional dynamic, and suggest that the wings of the 
Scottish Government’s energy policy are being clipped by Westminster: the Empire is striking back. 
In this context, before examining the key provisions of the 2016 Act, it is instructive to first 
identify what is not in it. Specifically, there is no devolution of control over North Sea oil and gas, or 
the regulation of the energy industry, energy taxation and energy subsidies: these remain with 
Westminster. The only measure relating to offshore energy enables Scottish Ministers to act in 
relation to declaring safety zones around, and the decommissioning of, offshore renewable energy 
developments in Scottish waters.6 The most noteworthy energy provision in the 2016 Act, in line 
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with the post-referendum Smith Commission report,7 is the devolution of control over licensing and 
mineral rights access for fracking.8 The Scottish Government, of course, already had an effective 
veto over this under the devolved planning and environmental protection regimes, and had put in 
place a moratorium on the granting of planning consents for all onshore unconventional oil and gas 
developments, including fracking, pending the outcome of a public consultation. Politically, however, 
the devolution of more comprehensive fracking controls to Holyrood avoids putting wind in the sails 
of pro-independence campaigners. Moreover, given the recent UK Government decisions mentioned 
above, the Scottish Government’s energy policy options are now limited: the most obvious way in 
which it can protect Scotland’s energy independence is to proceed with fracking. Given the 
unpopularity of doing so, this may prove a poisoned chalice for Holyrood: the UK Government was, 
in all likelihood, not unhappy to devolve responsibility for decision-taking. The other energy powers 
devolved by the 2016 Act are political window-dressing, and an implicit reassertion of Westminster’s 
strategic control over energy.  
What then are the key energy measures introduced by the 2016 Act? It makes provision for 
four issues. These are, in the order that the Act sets them out, onshore oil and gas extraction; fuel 
poverty support systems and energy company obligations; a consultative role for the Scottish 
Government in relation to renewable electricity incentive schemes and the Gas and Electricity 
Markets Authority. 
B. Onshore oil and gas extraction 
Section 47 of the 2016 Act amends the Scotland Act 19989 to provide the Scottish Parliament with 
legislative competence over the granting and regulation of licences to search and bore for and to get 
petroleum within the Scottish onshore area: such licences include authority to obtain access to 
land.10 Scottish Ministers have also been empowered to exercise the licensing powers held by the UK 
Secretary of State under the Petroleum Act 1998 and other legislation.11 Therefore, as well as 
authorising conventional onshore oil and natural gas operations, Scottish Ministers are now able to 
license onshore fracking to extract shale gas or coalbed methane operations. As indicated above, 
given that there is considerable political controversy surrounding fracking (and the fact that some 
licenses have already been issued12), the issue is likely to prove challenging for Holyrood. 
It should, however, be noted that underground coal gasification (“UCG”) operations do not 
fall within the formal definition of petroleum, and are instead licensed by the UK Coal Authority.13 
The Scottish Government was, however, recently able to use its pre-existing control over planning 
and environmental protection to establish a moratorium on a major UCG project in the Firth of Forth 
(which although off the coast of Fife, still fell within the onshore baseline boundary). As a result, the 
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project was dropped. The failure to devolve the full power to regulate onshore UCG seems to be an 
obvious omission. It is perhaps explicable by the politicised context of the decision to devolve 
fracking outlined above: the lack of goodwill between Westminster and the Scottish Government 
after the independence referendum is such that the former would not favour additional devolution 
beyond the Smith Report’s recommendations.  
It should also be observed that, as per paragraph 83 of the Smith Report, the taxation of oil 
and gas receipts remains reserved to Westminster. Scottish Ministers are therefore not permitted to 
make provision for any model clauses in licences granted by them relating to the money payable for 
a licence, which could be seen as a form of taxation.14  
C. Fuel poverty support systems 
Section 58 of the 2016 Act amends the Energy Act 2010 and provides for a number of relatively low-
key powers for Scottish Ministers in relation to fuel poverty support schemes. They have been given 
a role in deciding local aspects of support schemes in Scotland. Importantly, the UK Secretary of 
State has the key functions of determining the licensed suppliers to whom the scheme should apply, 
the amount of benefits to be provided by them and the other main issues governing the design and 
function of the schemes. Scottish Ministers are also subject to the discretion of the UK Secretary of 
State, who is clearly in control. Thus, they have no right to be consulted by the UK Secretary of State 
and their exercise of the powers that they do have must be agreed by her – who on the face of it has 
an absolute discretion when taking a decision. The UK Secretary of State is therefore empowered to 
establish support schemes in Scotland and to vary and revoke regulations made by Scottish 
Ministers with and without their agreement in specified circumstances. In the context of the low-
intensity conflict between Westminster and Holyrood, these are fairly widely drawn: that is, inter 
alia, where a support scheme made in relation to Scotland is (in the opinion of the Secretary of 
State) likely to cause detriment to the UK, or adversely affect the ability of the UK to comply with an 
international agreement or arrangement in relation to climate change or energy efficiency, and 
Scottish Ministers have failed to comply with the Secretary of State’s wishes.15 
D. Energy company obligations 
Section 59 of the 2016 Act makes provision to amend the Gas Act 1986 and the Electricity Act 1989 
in order to transfer a number of powers previously held by the Secretary of State dealing with the 
promotion of reductions in carbon emissions and the costs of home heating in Scotland by gas and 
electricity supply companies.  Accordingly, Scottish Ministers are now able to detail how suppliers 
may meet the obligations which have been determined and imposed by the Secretary of State, 
thereby meeting criticisms that such schemes have hitherto failed to take adequate account of the 
distinctive features of the Scottish energy context, such as the nature of the housing stock. That said, 
it is clear that, as with fuel poverty and support systems, the Secretary of State is in overall charge. 
Thus, the powers to decide whether there should be an obligation, the length of obligation periods, 
the suppliers who are to be subject to obligations, how new suppliers16 are to be treated, the 
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distribution of obligations between suppliers, the power to vary such obligations and to impose 
obligations on electricity distributors or gas transporters all remain with the Secretary of State.  
In this context, before acting, Scottish Ministers must also consult with and obtain the consent 
of the Secretary of State, and consult with bodies such as the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority, 
energy suppliers and Citizens Advice Scotland. In order to avoid interfering with UK-wide targets set 
by the Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers are obliged to ensure that they do not exceed the costs 
of the obligation that have been apportioned to Scotland. Again, the Secretary of State is able to 
exercise the powers which have been transferred to Scottish Ministers, either with their agreement 
or without it, in the event that the actions of Scottish Ministers are likely to be detrimental to the 
UK, have an adverse effect on the UK’s ability to meet international agreements in relation to 
climate change or energy efficiency, or result in suppliers having to meet costs which are not broadly 
equivalent in relation to England and Wales and in relation to Scotland.17 Section 60 of the 2016 Act 
makes further provision for inter alia the apportionment by the Secretary of State of overall carbon 
emission and home-heating cost reduction targets between Scotland and the rest of Great Britain; 
the ability of suppliers to elect that measures carried out on one side of the border should be 
treated as being carried out on the other side; and the need for Scottish Ministers to consent to 
measures which have been carried out in England and Wales being treated as if they had been 
carried out in Scotland. 
E. Renewable electricity incentive scheme consultation and the Gas and Electricity Market 
Authority 
Finally in relation to energy, section 61 of the 2016 Act introduces a limited18 duty for the Secretary 
of State to consult with Scottish Ministers prior to setting up or amending a renewable electricity 
incentive scheme. This is, of course, only a duty to consult, and does not prima facie imply anything 
more than that. Under section 64 of the Act, the Gas and Electricity Market Authority has also been 
put under a statutory obligation to send a copy of its reports to Scottish Ministers, who must in turn 
lay a copy of the annual reports before the Scottish Parliament, and under section 66 the authority 
can now be compelled to appear before the Parliament. The recommendation in the Smith Report 
that there should be a “formal consultative role for the Scottish Government and the Scottish 
Parliament in designing renewables incentives and the strategic priorities set out in the Energy 
Strategy and Policy Statement”19 to which the authority must have due regard was not, however, 
implemented directly in relation to the Scottish Parliament. Scottish Ministers were already 
statutory consultees, and the 2016 Act puts them on a similar footing to the Secretary of State, who 
is under a duty to lay the authority’s reports before both Houses of Parliament.20  This provision 
looks rather like political window-dressing. It remains to be seen whether the power to compel the 
authority to appear before the Scottish Parliament will amount to more than that but, given the 
limited nature of the powers devolved to Scottish Ministers, it may be thought unlikely. 
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 F. Conclusion 
The Scotland Act 2016, unsurprisingly given the outcome of the 2014 independence referendum, 
maintains the primacy of the UK Government and Parliament over energy policy and legislation in 
Scotland. The only significant devolution of authority to Scottish Ministers is in relation to onshore 
fracking, over which they already had considerable influence through the exercise of pre-existing 
devolved powers. The other energy related powers devolved to Scottish Ministers by the Act are 
non-strategic executive functions and consultation and reporting obligations which maintain, and 
indeed highlight, the overall control of energy decision-taking by the UK Secretary of State. Set 
against the backdrop of the UK Government’s recent decisions on issues such as the abrupt axing of 
renewables subsidies and support for carbon storage development, and the swift closure of 
Longannet coal-fired power station, the Act signals the re-assertion of Westminster’s control of 
energy policy in Scotland after attempts by the Scottish Government to establish Scottish energy 
independence as part of its broader case for political independence. 
 
 
